英语翻译ConclusionsIn one of the first studies of its kind,this work empiricallyexamines the effects of agency and information asymmetry issuesembedded in structural form credit models on bank credit riskevaluation using bank data from 2001 to 20

英语翻译ConclusionsIn one of the first studies of its kind,this work empiricallyexamines the effects of agency and information asymmetry issuesembedded in structural form credit models on bank credit riskevaluation using bank data from 2001 to 20
英语翻译
Conclusions
In one of the first studies of its kind,this work empirically
examines the effects of agency and information asymmetry issues
embedded in structural form credit models on bank credit risk
evaluation using bank data from 2001 to 2005.Findings show five
independent factors relating to information asymmetry and agency
problems explaining the absolute predicting differences of various
structural models from 42.6% to 78.3%.The factors include "man-
agement-equity agency effect-free cash flow",debt-equity agency
effect","information asymmetry","debt-equity agency effect-re-
verse wealth transfers"and "management-equity agency effect-
cost efficiency".Credit risk literature rarely discusses these factors,which should be incorporated into credit risk modeling.More specifically,adding more parameters to existing models that incorporate the views of both debt and equity holders can be a way of fixing current models.The empirical results also give clues for an optimal specification for structural form models such as including parameters reflecting dynamic interest rate and settings that reflect information asymmetry and various agency effects.
Acknowledgements
We are indebted to anonymous referees and Young Ho Eom for
helpful comments and suggestions; and also to the seminar partic-
ipants at National Taiwan University and the Second International
Conference on Asia-Pacific Financial Markets (2007).We thank the
National Science Council of Taiwan for financial support and
acknowledge the research assistance of Wei-Ling Kuo.

英语翻译ConclusionsIn one of the first studies of its kind,this work empiricallyexamines the effects of agency and information asymmetry issuesembedded in structural form credit models on bank credit riskevaluation using bank data from 2001 to 20
结论
在最初的研究中,这类工作进行了实证分析
考察了影响信息不对称问题的代理
嵌入在银行信用模型结构形式的信用风险
使用银行资料评估从2001年至2005年.结果显示五
独立因素与信息不对称、代理
问题的绝对差异的解释预测不同
从结构模型对78.3% 42.6%.“人的因素包括:-)
agement-equity代理effect-free现金流”,负债权益
效应”、“信息不对称”、“负债权益代理effect-re -
诗歌的财富转移”和“management-equity机构作用-
成本效益”.信用风险的文献探讨这些因素,而很少,应当纳入信贷风险模型.更确切地说,增加更多的参数,对现有模型结合景色的债务和股权持有者能成为一种固定电流模式.实证结果也提供了一些线索,为优化模型的结构形式的规格参数如包括反映动态利率和设置,反映出了信息不对称和各种机构的效果.
“
承蒙匿名裁判和年轻的医院为.Eom这种
有益的意见和建议,并出席partic -
国立台湾大学ipants和第二国际
会议在亚太地区的金融市场(2007).
国家科学委员会对台湾金融支持和
承认研究资助的费用阔.